Abstract: This paper addresses enabling solutions to enhance the NATO and EU cooperation facing the new emergency threats that characterize current crisis scenarios. Military and civilian actors are required to work together and cooperate in Crisis Management, using state-of-the-art capabilities for solving societal crises in order to prevent the escalation to conflict and to avoid or alleviate the consequences of natural or man-made disasters. However, technical shortfalls and political issues still hamper the integration and cost-effectiveness use of NATO and EU capabilities. The NEC/Web-2 concept can enable interoperability between NATO and EU; military support of C4ISR capabilities to civilian authorities cooperating in both civil emergencies and crisis management could be the key driver to overcome the political issues that still undermine NATO and EU cooperation and therefore a pragmatic approach to pooling and sharing of capabilities, thus preventing duplication of efforts. Following the principles of C4ISR Comprehensive Approach, this article highlights the initiative of NC3A-the NEC architect for NATO-to support multi-national and interagency interoperability for civil-military cooperation in coordination with NATO OPS Division and relevant EU and international governmental and non-governmental bodies involved in Crisis Management/Civil Emergency operations. It also outlines enabling cooperation areas such as Science and Technology, regional cooperation and joint exercises in crisis management.
Introduction
The world around NATO and EU has changed over the past two decades. International 'Crisis Management' (CM) is today the key concept of NATO and EU defence and security policy and strategy, almost entirely replacing the concept of 'deterrence' that addressed past cold-war scenarios of a bipolar world.
The new security environment is unpredictable and rapidly evolving. New threats originate from weak states, asymmetric conflicts, organized crime, cyber attacks, WMD, energy and climate challenges, natural or man-made catastrophes. These new security challenges push NATO and EU countries to re-evaluate the word crises and CM, originally considered as the short phase between the end of an almost stable period of peace and war, as a permanent 'therapy' (conflict or disaster prevention) that needs to start very long before reaching the 'critical' stage, where overcoming the turning point is never likely to happen. 1 Today multi-dimensional and 'quantum style' security threats demand therefore a comprehensive response-a 'Comprehensive Approach' (CA)-in which civilian and military crisis management activities need to be coordinated. This CM coordination is at all levels: civil-civil (e.g. diplomats, aid workers and policemen), military-military (different contributing countries), but more and more at civil-military level, both for civilian support to military in the field (CIMIC/CMCO) and in particular for military support to civilian actors (designated also as DSCA -Defence Support to Civilian Authorities) during a disaster relief mission. 2 The lesson learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and Western Balkans, makes clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximize coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort. 3 As the Comprehensive Approach aims to bring together different actors around a common management of complex crises, it poses the question of the links between international organizations when they intervene on a common territory, such as in the Afghanistan war (where NATO, UN and EU are present together) or in the Haiti earthquake crisis (where several governmental and non-governmental organisations contributed together with UN and various military capability support). 4 Specific NATO and EU CA issues in crisis management derive from the two organizations' potential complementarity. This complementarity is due to a large shared membership (21 common members), a shared strategic vision, overlapping operational ambitions and policy initiatives in the capability development field (i.e. NRF and EU Battle-groups) and the need to make best use of decreasing resources and avoid duplication of efforts. 5 Probably the main issue is that NATO is a military Alliance mainly based on article 5 and therefore the EU, holding civilian crisis management capabilities already institutionalized with the organization, should play the role which NATO cannot fulfil in CM scenarios. This is true in theory but practice shows a different situation. Even though-according the Council of the EU-the EU Battle-groups' full operational capability was achieved in early 2007, 6 many questions remain on their limited degree of interoperability and effectiveness of dealing with high risk and complex crisis situations. The EU Military Staff is working hard on interoperability plans covering the shortfalls identified by the EDA Capability Development Plan (CDP), but many capability gaps remain. The implementation of such plan will remain a long-term objective. 7 From the other side, one of NATO's main difficulties is the fact that the Alliance internally does not fully benefit from deployable civilian capabilities and integrating civilian aspects into military ones seems going beyond its mandate. Some common NATO and EU member allies push for a clearer and shared role between the two organizations, due also to financial problems related to CA by NATO (e.g. the reconstruction activities in Afghanistan).
It is clear that today many crises and conflicts require use of civilian capabilities of crisis management and a combination of diplomatic, economic and social instruments for which NATO is not fully equipped. The EU could be able to develop such a comprehensive policy where use of military capabilities is based on the principles of human security, protection of civilians and unbiased contribution. Therefore one realistic solution in facing complex crisis scenarios is the enhancement of EU C4ISR capabilities (in order to fulfill the interoperability shortfalls) through a stronger and pragmatic cooperation with NATO.
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Theory and Practice of NATO-EU Cooperation
The NATO-EU cooperation on security and defence is one of the relevant issues of the new NATO Strategic Concept:
An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the EuroAtlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:
• fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
• enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field; • broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives; • cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness. 9 The European Union also addressed the need of a stronger partnership with NATO in a spirit of mutual reinforcement and respect for their decision making autonomy. The European Council noted the NATO's statement in the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit declaration concerning the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence and welcoming the EU's efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges. The Council particularly stressed the importance of efficient operational cooperation between the EU and NATO, in particular concerning theatres in which both organizations are committed. The Council also reiterated the necessity to continue to further exploit the approved framework for association of non-EU European Allies with the ESDP, in accordance with EU procedures. 10 Both NATO and EU have logically identified similar shortfalls in military capabilities that limit the deployability and sustainability of respective Crisis Management assets in spite of their huge overall numbers. Therefore, various initiatives have been launched to enhance capability development. Today formal coordination on capability development takes place in the NATO-EU Capability Group. 11 Membership of the group comprises NATO and non-NATO EU Members that have security agreement with NATO. NATO is typically represented by DPP (Defence and Policy Planning) and DI (Defence Investment) Divisions of the International Staff and defence representatives and advisors from the missions and capitals. EU is usually represented by Permanent Representations' counsellors to the Political-Military Group, the EDA PP (Policy and Plan) unit and the CMPD (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate).
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Despite proven shared capability requirements, the work of NATO-EU CG is weakened by political problem similar to those encountered at PSC (EU Political and Security Committee) and NAC (NATO North Atlantic Council) level. Membership in NATO and EU does not overlap completely, there is lack of a security agreement between NATO and EDA and absence of an arrangement with Turkey. The main issue is that Member States still make decisions on national defence planning with little or no reference to either NATO or the EU, whose guidelines are often trumped by considerations of prestige, national defence industry and budget. The result is a very fragmented effort. As Nations insist on remaining active in a wide range of capability areas, in spite of the decreasing size of armed forces and defence budgets, a plethora of small-scale capabilities, of limited deployability and low cost-effectiveness, is scattered across Europe. The strategic enablers required to achieve the transformation to expeditionary operations and civil-military assets in order to face complex crisis missions are being developed very slowly. At the same time, massive duplications and redundancies are maintained in areas of limited usefulness, huge cuts in national defence budgets up to 25 percent done with no coordination with the other allies may lead to a sum total of European capabilities that is even less coherent and employable than is the case today.
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NATO and EU Civil Military Capabilities in Crisis Management
After assessing the importance of the NATO and EU relationships, which highlighted common shortfalls and issues that impede an authentic strategic association between the two organizations and a realist cooperation in capability development, it is essential to analyze how to increase and deepen the strategic collaboration in Crisis Management and Civil Emergencies in order to ensure a practical and effective coordination in the scenarios in which both NATO and EU are requested to intervene. It seems logical that if NATO tends to implement the comprehensive approach as the remedy or general solution in crisis management, the definition of security adopted by NATO must be in line with that approach. This broad concept of security will obviously imply the need to act through civilian capacities, and not solely through military force. Discussions of NEC concepts focus almost exclusively on the post-crisis phases of the conflict spectrum. But Crisis Management is a relevant area where NEC concepts and improved interoperability could play a critical role. A non-traditional or emergent threat, which is trans-national and asymmetric in nature, demands new ways of fostering rapid and coordinated crisis responses by both civilian and military actors. C4ISR capabilities and methodologies offer tools to help predict early signs of an emerging crisis. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) can be exploited to rapidly form crisis action teams providing seamless access to relevant data and shared consultations. Information assurance techniques help the protection of certain sensitive categories of information from cyber attacks.
As explained above, civil-military cooperation in crisis management is not always possible or wanted by all players. Divergences on perspectives, missions and goals as well as cultural, social and political differences make cooperation between military and some civil organizations very difficult to achieve. Each organization normally develops its own ICT solutions to support crisis and emergency response. However, this normally results in a lack of interoperability and coordination not only between organizations, but even within the organization itself. Therefore, technical-operational information sharing and interoperability solutions could be important enablers to improve coordination.
The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) has launched a multi-national initiative aiming to complement the efforts of NATO, national and international organizations (e.g. Strategic Commands, CIMIC Centre of Excellence and civil-military Coordination Offices for humanitarian assistance) in the DOTMLPF 18 approach by providing a full NEC/Web-2 capability architecture (DOTMLPFI + Interoperability) addressing the principles of Federations and Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). 19 The goal of the Multi National CIvil-Military InterOPerability initiative (MN CMIOP) is to improve civil-military interaction and provide comprehensive solutions to Nations through establishing a collaborative civil-military environment-a forum-where the most critical problems are identified and analyzed, and solutions are explored, specified and validated (see Figure 3) . NC3A has extensive experience in supporting NATO efforts in Crisis Response Operations and in complex C4ISR interoperability endeavours. Interoperability is addressed at three levels:
• Technical, including the specification of interfaces and profiles for services, protocols and data to be used by each of the participating systems, as much as possible, by adopting, tailoring and completing (if required) available international or de-facto standards; 
Conclusion
Having analyzed the new emergency security challenges and 'quantum style' security threats of the post 9/11 period, the Crisis Management concept that is taking over the deterrence concept of the post cold-war era, the importance of Comprehensive Approach for Crisis Management missions, the emerging concept of military support to civilian authorities involved in complex man-made or natural disasters and the importance of a C4ISR interoperability between NATO and EU capabilities, some conclusions and recommendations can be drawn up.
First of all, there is the need of a clear distribution of burdens and responsibilities, and the complementarity between NATO and the EU through harmonization of respective capabilities and a reconciliation of their level of ambition. For crisis management operations requiring civilian capacities, NATO could rely on the EU applying a sort of "Berlin Plus in reverse" concept. Similarly, if additional civilian crisis management resources are needed, NATO could support other EU capabilities, such as the EU MIC, or enhance the cooperation through the European Defence Agency through implementation of real joint initiatives. 25 The working of the NATO-EU Capability Group should be optimized with a view on improving interaction and transparency between the two organizations, addressing pragmatic and short-term results focusing on "single-capability" meetings. More staff-to-staff technical contacts and participation in joint initiatives could solve most of the political problems curbing the NATO-EU cooperation.
The NC3A Multi National initiative on civil-military interoperability can facilitate the above solutions and enhance the common NATO and EU capability's coherency, putting together on the same table the different actors which are called to intervene in crisis management scenarios and need to cooperate and share common C4ISR capabilities.
Joint exercises are also key enablers for C4ISR interoperability and capability enhancement and can stimulate inter-governmental cross-cooperation and Civil Protection Centres in sharing responsibilities and responding to emergencies.
Further steps in NATO and EU cooperation in Crisis Management are pragmatic shared activities between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and NATO procurement agencies, such as NC3A and NAMSA. Finally the Europe's Galileo satellite navigation network project could provide a complementary support to defence networks in real-time ISR for Crisis Management.
Notes:
